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Restrictions on Use of Intellectual
Property Rights
Harold S. Meyer*
NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS are generally considered to in-
clude patents, copyrights, and ownership of unpublished
technical data or "know-how," and sometimes trademarks. In
spite of the basic differences in character between trademark
rights and the others, all these rights are often dealt with as a
group, particularly in Europe, where they are known collectively
as industrial property rights.
Restrictions of various kinds have come into existence in the
United States, limiting utilization or exploitation of these rights.
Such restrictions are found primarily in the anti-trust laws. To
understand these restrictions, it is essential to bear in mind the
character of the rights themselves.
Patents and copyrights are creatures of statutes, authorized
by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Patent rights, under
the present statute,' give the owner of a novel invention, who
has obtained letters patent by compliance with the requirements
of the law, the privilege for seventeen years of excluding others
from practice of the invention, or of permitting it to be practiced
on such terms as may be agreed on by a license. Copyrights,
under the present statute, 2 give the owner of a literary or artistic
or musical composition who has placed the prescribed notice on
all copies published and obtained a registration certificate, the
privilege for twenty-eight years, renewable for another twenty-
eight years, or preventing others from copying the work, or of
permitting it to be copied and used under a license.
Know-how and trademarks can be protected under general
principles of law, apart from statutes, although we have a federal
trademark registration law3 which gives important procedural
benefits. Know-how remains the absolute property of its posses-
sor as long as he does not disclose it to anyone else. Once dis-
closed, it becomes the possession of the recipient also, unless
there is an agreement between the originator and recipient as
to ownership, terms of use and the like. Trade names and trade-
marks are the property of those who adopt and use them in con-
ducting a business, and constitute the specifically identifiable part
of the good-will of the business.
* Member of the Ohio Bar; Patent Counsel of the B. F. Goodrich Com-
pany of Akron, Ohio; Director, United States Trade Mark Association;
Member, American Bar Association-Patent, Trade Mark and Copyright
Section; Member, American Bar Association Committee on Program for
Protection of Industrial Designs; former Vice President, Cleveland Patent
Law Association; etc.
1 35 U. S. C. §§ 101-103, 154.
2 17 U. S. C. §§ 1, 10, 20, 101.
3 15 U. S. C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1114-1117.
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Anti-trust Laws
The name "anti-trust laws" is a curious misnomer, not
found in the earliest statutes themselves. 4 This name arose from
the historical fact that objectionable monopolies were being
created by the device of placing in trust the voting stock of
ostensibly competing business corporations, so that the trustees
(who were not the beneficial owners) could use the control of
the corporations to restrain freedom of business action and to
obtain unfair advantages over others. Obviously, the anti-trust
laws have nothing to do with trusts of the ordinary kind, and
are in fact anti-monopoly laws.
The first of these laws was the Sherman Act of 1890,5 pro-
hibiting in broad, general terms all contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, as well as at-
tempts to monopolize any part of trade or commerce. The other
laws, enacted in 1914, are the Clayton Act' and the Federal
Trade Commission Act.7 The Clayton Act prohibits a number
of specific practices such as price discrimination, agreements
requiring a customer not to purchase from a competitor of the
seller, and mergers of competing businesses, when such practices
tend to destroy competition; in each case with various qualifi-
cations intended to permit fair and non-monopolistic action. The
Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair methods of com-
petition and deceptive advertising, and established the Federal
Trade Commission, which has the task of enforcing these re-
strictions and also some other functions.
Amendments have been made from time to time, in some of
which exceptions to the general prohibitions have been estab-
lished. Thus, the "fair trade" law of 19378 permitted a supplier
of branded goods, which are in free competition with other like
goods, to prescribe minimum resale prices if such arrangements
are lawful in the state in which the resale occurs. In another
special statute, originating over sixty years ago, owners of trade-
marks were given the right to prevent importation by others of
goods bearing the same trademarks. 9
The general purpose of all these laws is to foster competi-
tion, and to ensure as far as possible freedom of opportunity for
all to engage in any desired kind of business. Nevertheless, the
system is a patchwork in which attempts have been made to cover
up weaknesses, or to relax unduly stringent controls, in language
4 Except indirectly, in the phrase "combination in the form of trust or
otherwise."
5 15U. S.C. §§1to7.
6 Id. §§ 12 to 27.
7 Id §§41 to 58.
8 Incorporated in 15 U. S. C. § 1, supplemented later by 15 U. S. C. § 45n.
9 15 U. S. C. § 1124, the language of which has not been changed since 1905,
was based on an earlier tariff act provision, and was supplemented in 1922
by 19 U. S. C. § 1526.
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which is often confusing and sometimes apparently contradictory
in purpose or effect.
The apparent contradictions are especially troublesome with
respect to ownership of such intangibles as intellectual property
rights, partly because of the inconsistency between the legal con-
cept of ownership as denoting absolute control over the property
owned and the prohibition of some forms of control in the anti-
trust laws. Even worse, patents and other intellectual property
rights are sometimes characterized as legal monopolies, which
some people find difficult to reconcile with our anti-monopoly
laws.
Actually, Congress and the courts have established a bal-
ance for intangible property (as for any other kind of property)
between freedom of use and restrictions on those uses regarded
as injurious to our society. Those restrictions of greatest in-
terest are outlined here.
Suppression of Competing Patents
Suppression of patents is often alleged. Typical examples
have been the rumored purchase by a safety razor manufacturer
of a permanent razor blade patent, or purchase by an oil com-
pany of an automobile carburetor patent which would double fuel
mileage, and suppression of the invention by the purchaser to
protect his established business in repeat sales of supplies. In
such aggravated forms, suppression has never been proven.
Non-use of patented inventions is commonplace. Non-use
may occur when a company develops and patents several dif-
ferent ways to accomplish a result, and exploits only that one
which appears to be most advantageous,10 or when a particular
invention cannot compete because of excessive cost or inefficiency
or other failure to meet the needs of users. In other cases, in-
ventors encounter the frustrating experience of being unable
either to finance production and marketing or to persuade others
to undertake such a financial risk (partly because our tax laws
make it impossible to retain rewards for success commensurate
with the magnitude of risks). But non-use alone is not ob-jectionable and has not been characterized by the epithet "sup-
pression." 11
Suppression of patents has been found to violate the Sherman
Act, when the patents represent alternative or competing ways
to accomplish a result, and are acquired for the specific pur-
pose of eliminating actual or potential competition. 12 This is
true whether the patents are purchased directly or whether they
are acquired by purchase of the business in which they are used.
10 Special Equipment v. Coe, 324 U. S. 370 (1945); Automatic Radio v.
Hazeltine, 339 U. S. 827 (1950).
11 Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern, 210 U. S. 405 (1908).
12 Hartford-Empire v. U. S., 323 U. S. 386 (1945); Besser Mfg. v. U. S., 343
U. S. 444 (1952).
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The courts have been particularly outspoken in condemning
acquisition of competing businesses which are then discontinued.
Acquisition of non-competing patents or businesses is not ob-
jectionable, especially when the acquired business is continued. 13
Conflicting patents are those owned by different entities but
which cover the same industrial operation or product. Conflict
between patents can occur when one person makes and patents
an invention and another invents an improvement within the
scope of the first patent. It can also occur when different people
own patents on complementary inventions, such as a process and
an especially advantageous machine for carrying out the process.
The consequence is that each patent owner can prevent the owner
of the other patent from practicing the conflicting inventions, so
that the public will be deprived of any benefit of the inventions
during the life of the patents unless the conflict is resolved. In
such situations no objection is made to acquisition of patents for
elimination of the conflict, as the result is to make available to
the public something which otherwise might be unavailable. 14
Competition in supply of merchandise is not enough to as-
sure maintenance of the maximum degree of freedom of business
which is desirable in the public interest. There should also be
competition in making of improvements. This is not brought out
very clearly in the published cases, but it is definitely the policy
of the Department of Justice in order to eliminate any arrange-
ments which might restrict the freedom or the incentive of com-
petitors to conduct competitive research, and thus to suppress
the creation of inventions.' 5
Pooling of Patents
Pooling of patents means bringing under common control
patents which were previously under different ownership, in-
cluding arrangements between two patent owners as well as
those involving patents of many owners.
Acquisition of conflicting patents in order to resolve a con-
flict has already been stated to be unobjectionable. Similarly,
the resolution of a conflict by a cross-license, in which each owner
grants to the other a non-exclusive license, is unobjectionable
since it removes restrictions rather than imposes them.'6 Such
an arrangement permits the participants to compete with each
other, and does not exclude competition by others who may be
able to acquire the necessary patent rights.
Exclusive cross-licensing, on the other hand, is an agree-
ment giving the participants, by joint action, freedom from com-
13 U. S. v American Tobacco, 221 U. S. 106 (1911); U. S. v. Columbia Steel,
334 U. S. 495 (1948).
14 U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery, 247 U. S. 32 (1918).
15 See U. S. v. General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N. J. 1949) where a
licensee's volume of business was restricted.
16 U. S. v. Birdsboro Steel, 139 F. Supp. 244 (D. W. D. Penn. 1956).
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petition for the life of the patents, and is therefore clearly an
agreement in restraint of trade, prohibited by the Sherman Act.17
These same rules apply to patent pools with more than two
participants. Arrangements bringing together all patent rights
needed for a particular industrial operation are approved if
others than the parties to the arrangements are not excluded.' 8
Thus, pooling of patents is unobjectionable if the patents are in-
dividually licensed, or if a license under the group of patents in
the pool is freely available on reasonable terms. Any restric-
tions on operations of the participants will cause the arrange-
ment to be condemned as an illegal restraint of trade. 19 This in-
cludes specifically restrictions as to prices which may be charged
by the participants, all price-fixing in cross-licenses having been
declared to be improper.2 0
The grant of a license on condition that the licensee will
grant a license back to the patent owner, to use the licensee's
improvements, is a special form of pooling. Patent owners are
reluctant to license competitors unless they can acquire the right
to use existing and future improvements made by the licensees.
Otherwise, the licensees would be likely to acquire a competi-
tive advantage by being able to operate under the original pat-
ent and also being able to prevent the owner of the original pat-
ent from supplying the improved form of the invention.21 Avail-
ability of a back-license under the licensees' improvements gives
the patent owner an incentive to grant licenses to competitors,
and has been specifically approved.2 2 But the use of back-licenses
is not free from problems, since multiple back-licenses from sev-
eral licensees would give the patent owner a preferred position
(besides receipt of royalties) in being the only one able to use
all improvements.23 On the other hand, an open pool, in which
all existing and future improvements are available to all licensees,
while it eliminates the problem just mentioned, could be criticized
as lessening the incentive to carry out competitive research, and
is actually distasteful to some important companies for that
reason. A possible solution to this dilemma, which has been
used sometimes, is to give the original patent owner a back-li-
cense from each licensee in any event, and also to give each
licensee at the time of signature of the license the choice whether
17 U. S. v. Associated Patents, 134 F. Supp. 74 (D. E. D. Mich. 1955).
18 Standard Oil v. U. S., 283 U. S. 163 (1931); Baker-Cammack v. Davis,
181 F. 2d 550 (4th Cir. 1950).
19 Standard Sanitary v. U. S., 226 U. S. 20 (1912); U. S. v. National Lead,
332 U. S. 319 (1947); U. S. v. U. S. Gypsum, 340 U. S. 76 (1950).
20 U. S. v. Line Material, 333 U. S. 287 (1948); U. S. v. General Electric, 82
F. Supp. 753 (D. N. J. 1949).
21 U. S. v. National Lead, 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
22 U. S. v. General Electric, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D. N. J. 1953), and various
consent decrees.
23 U. S. v. Aluminum Co., 91 F. Supp. 333 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
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he wishes to acquire a license to use future improvements of
other licensees in return for an obligation to grant a similar li-
cense to the other licensees. Of course, these problems do not
exist at all if the patent owner and the licensees are not com-
petitive.24
Restrictive Licenses
It is clear now that a patent gives its owner only the right
to exclude others from practice of the patented invention.2 5 He
may agree not to exercise his right to exclude against a par-
ticular person or company, and such an agreement is a license.
If that were all that was done, except to compensate the patent
owner, as by a suitable royalty payment, there would be few
problems. Licenses granted by a patent owner who is not prac-
ticing the invention are often as simple as that. Licenses to
competitors are more troublesome.
Patent owners have found by experience that it is not al-
ways to their best advantage to try to maintain complete ex-
clusiveness. Sometimes this would be impossible because the
patentee could not finance the needed scale of operations. Some-
times exclusiveness would encourage others to design around
the patent. Sometimes customers insist on multiple sources for
patented products. In any event, royalty income can be at-
tractive.
But the patent owner cannot be expected to favor licensing
of a powerful competitor at the risk of having the licensee under-
sell or in some other way destroy the patentee's business. Con-
sequently, various restrictions have been put in license agree-
ments in order to protect the patentee's business, and many of
these restrictions have been approved. Thus, a license agree-
ment may require maintenance of a reasonable quality standard;
or may limit the licensee's volume of business in practicing the
patented invention; 2, or may restrict the nature of the licensee's
product, so as to avoid direct competition with the patentee.
27
A license agreement may establish a minimum sales price for the
licensed product,25 or may limit the territory in which the li-
censee is permitted to practice the patented invention.2 9 If the
licensee is operating in a foreign country, the license may be
limited to patents in a specified country or countries.3 0
24 Transparent Wrap v. Stokes & Smith, 329 U. S. 637 (1947).
25 35 U. S. C. 154.
26 Rubber Tire Wheel v. Milwaukee Rubber, 154 Fed. 358 (7th Cir. 1907);
U. S. v. DuPont, 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd 351 U. S. 377 (1956).
27 General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric, 305 U. S. 124 (1938).
28 U. S. v. General Electric, 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
20 35 U. S. C. § 261; Brownell v. Ketcham, 211 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
The licensee's customers are free from this restriction. See Keeler v.
Standard Folding Bed, 157 U. S. 659 (1895).
30 U. S. v. DuPont, 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd. 351 U. S. 377
(1956); U. S. v. L. D. Caulk, 126 F. Supp. 693 (D. Del. 1954).
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Both Congress and the courts have been asked repeatedly
to outlaw these various restrictions in license agreements, and
both have consistently declined to do so, although there have been
strong minority opinions in the Supreme Court in favor of pro-
hibiting these restrictions.3 1 The courts, however, have drastical-
ly restricted the usefulness of some of the restrictions in license
agreements. Disapproval of price-fixing in cross-licenses has al-
ready been mentioned.32 Territorial restrictions in cross-licenses
have also been disapproved.33 While the price charges by a
licensee may be established, the resale price charged by the li-
censee's customer may not be fixed.3 4 The latter is actually only
an extension of the rule that the patentee may not fix resale prices
charged by his customers 35 (except to the extent permitted by
the "fair trade" laws, which are discussed below).
Use of identical restrictions in a plurality of licenses has
never been explicitly disapproved by the courts, but the Depart-
ment of Justice has taken the position that acceptance of a re-
stricted license (one specifying a minimum price, for instance)
with knowledge of previous grant of such a license to another,
would be regarded as a prohibited conspiracy. This position of
the Department of Justice seems quite out of keeping with the
rationale of United States v. General Electric,36 in which licenses
containing restrictions for the protection of the patentee's busi-
ness were explicitly approved. Nevertheless, the position of the
Department of Justice at least constitutes a hazard that anti-trust
suits might be brought against concerns that attempt to use such
arrangements.
The most important limitation on restrictive licenses is that
they are permissible only for the protection of the patentee's
own business in practicing the patented invention against harm-
ful competition by his licensee. Thus a non-manufacturing pat-
entee may not fix the prices charged by his licensees, 3T and a
process or machine patent may not be used to fix prices for the
product3s Moreover, the patentee may not agree to restrict his
own activities in any way, since that would definitely be a re-
straint of trade not justified in any way by ownership of the
patent.39
The patentee may, of course, make such unilateral decisions
31 U. S. v. Line Material, 333 U. S. 287 (1948).
32 See note 20 supra.
33 U. S. v. National Lead, 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
34 Ethyl Gasoline v. U. S., 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
35 Boston Store v. American Graphophone, 246 U. S. 8 (1918).
36 See note 28 supra.
37 U. S. v. New Wrinkle, 342 U. S. 371 (1952).
38 Barber Colman Co. v. National Tool, 136 F. 2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943);
contra, Straight Side Basket Co. v. Webster, 82 F. 2d 245 (2d Cir. 1936).
39 U. S. v. General Electric, 80 F. Supp. 989 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); U. S. v.
General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N. J. 1949).
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as are required in the conduct of his business, including whether
or not he should practice the patented invention at all, the ex-
tent to which it should be practiced and the character of prod-
ucts made, the price which should be charged, whether a license
should be granted to another, and if so, on what terms. So long
as these decisions are the patentee's alone, there can be no con-
flict with the anti-trust laws. Also, to the extent already ex-
plained, restrictions can be placed on licensees, but restrictions
can never safely be placed on the patent owners. The patentee,
if he retains any control over the patent, must retain complete
freedom to make all these decisions by himself. If he surrenders
control over any of these things to a licensee, he has made an
agreement in restraint of trade.
The only exception to the foregoing statement is that a pat-
ent may be sold outright (or exclusively licensed, which is prac-
tically the same, as the exclusive licensee is regarded as the
equitable owner). The original patentee is replaced by the new
owner, who must thereafter be the one who alone can make
the decisions as to how to deal with the patent.
A corollary of this principle that the patentee must make
the essential decision unilaterally is that any restrictions on the
grant of further licenses are illegal,40 including any veto power by
a licensee. 41 An exclusive license implicitly includes the right to
grant further licenses, but to be safe, this should be spelled out
in order to negative any possible conclusion that further licenses
could not be granted.
Royalties are a subject of negotiation, and payment agree-
ments, on any reasonable basis, are not ordinarily disturbed. It
is not even essential that payments be based on actual use of
the patented invention. Thus, when patents were so numerous
as to make it difficult to determine whether all products were
actually covered, payment of royalties based on the total of a de-
fined class was approved.42 But a requirement for payment of
royalties on clearly unpatented products was disapproved.43
A license agreement may not properly prevent the licensee
from dealing in unpatented goods or those of the patentee's
competitors. 44
Misuse (Control of Unpatented Supplies)
One of the most perplexing questions in either patent law
or anti-trust law is that of the extent of permissible control over
unpatented supplies or components used in practice of patented
40 U. S. v. General Electric, 80 F. Supp. 989 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
41 U. S. v. Besser Ifg., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E. D. Mich. 1951), aff'd 343 U. S.
444 (1952).
42 Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine, 339 U. S. 827 (1950).
43 U. S. v. U. S. Gypsum, 333 U. S. 364 (1948).
44 United Shoe Machinery v. U. S., 258 U. S. 451 (1922); McCullough v.
Kammerer, 166 F. 2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948).
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inventions. Often inventions are made by concerns in the busi-
ness of making and selling a particular kind of supplies for the
purpose of expanding their markets, and the patents may cover
combinations which the patent owner may not be able to assemble
but which include the unpatented supplies as components. In
these situations, the patent owner naturally expects to be able
to use the patent to obtain at least some competitive advantage
in the sale of the supplies.
The courts have dealt with this problem for many years and
have made decisions stating more and more definitely that a
patentee is not entitled to be free from competition in the supply
of unpatented components. 45 These decisions carefully refrained
from referring to the anti-trust laws, and were based on the con-
cept that it was inequitable for a patentee to use his combination
patent to control sales of the unpatented supplies, and that the
courts would not aid in enforcement of a patent as long as this
misuse continued. Finally, the Supreme Court in Mercoid v. Min-
neapolis-Honeywell46 completely changed the asserted basis for
the decisions and declared this practice to be a violation of the
anti-trust laws.
In that case, the supplies in question were specially designed
thermostats, not patented as such, but only as components of a
combination including a furnace and other components, and not
useful for any purpose except as components of the patented
combination. A competitor duplicated the specially-designed
thermostats and sold them for use in the patented combination,
and were sued as a contributory infringer. The decision, not
only denying a remedy for the infringement, but awarding dam-
ages under the anti-trust laws against the patentee, led to a
change in the statute.
The present patent law specifically declares that supply of
a non-staple component which is not capable of substantial non-
infringing use is contributory infringement, and also states that it
is not misuse of a patent to enforce it against a contributory in-
fringer.47 The precise effect of this is not altogether clear, but
it would seem to limit the effect of the misuse doctrine to situa-
tions in which the supplies are staple commodities capable of
various uses.48
So it would be unwise for an owner of a combination patent
involving staple components to attempt to monopolize supply of
the staple components to persons using the combination. The
only completely safe way to benefit from ownership of such a
45 Motion Picture Patents v. Universal, 243 U. S. 502 (1917); Carbice v.
American, 283 U. S. 27 (1931); Leitch v. Barber, 302 U. S. 458 (1938); Morton
Salt v. Suppiger, 314 U. S. 488 (1942).
46 Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell, 320 U. S. 680 (1944).
47 35 U. S. C. § 271(c) and (d).
48 Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. I. D. Russell, 212 F. 2d 414 (C. A. 8-1954),
cert. den., 348 U. S. 837 (1954).
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patent is to engage in the business of making the entire combina-
tion, or to license those who do make the combination on some
suitable royalty basis.
Package Licensing
Industrial concerns often accumulate groups of patents re-
lated to one another in such a way that a particular product or
its production may be covered in its various parts or aspects by
several or many of the patents. In such situations, licensees nat-
urally desire a license under all patents covering the licensed
product in any way.
A patent owner also may wish to obtain income from licens-
ing a group of patents, but a prospective licensee may decide that
he needs a license under only one or a few of them, and that it
would be disadvantageous to have a license, with accompanying
commitments as to validity, payment of royalties, etc., under pat-
ents which he may regard as invalid or at least not pertinent.
A refusal to grant any other than a "package license" under
an entire group of patents was condemned.4 9 But offering of a
"package license" is not objectionable where there is no refusal
to grant licenses under individual patents.50
Copyrights
In copyright licenses, as in patent licenses, anti-trust prob-
lems can arise, but the complexities are less because a large
proportion of all copyright contracts are relatively simple agree-
ments between authors on the one hand, and publishers of books
and magazines or producers of dramatic programs on the other
hand. Copyright agreements usually follow fairly well under-
stood forms and practices. The most outstanding problems are
those analogous to the "package license" under patents.
The right to exhibit motion pictures is acquired by a copy-
right license which specifies the extent of permitted exhibition
and the compensation to be paid. The owners of motion pictures,
in order to profit from less popular as well as from the most de-
sirable productions, engaged in "block booking," which required
exhibitors to take unwanted motion pictures in order to get those
actually desired by them and their customers. Such compulsory
block booking was held to be illegal.51
A similar problem arose in connection with performance of
musical compositions over the radio or in places of entertain-
ment. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP), controlling almost all copyrighted music, in-
stituted a licensing system charging a flat fee based on the type
of business and its capacity, for the privilege of performing any
49 Ethyl Gasoline v. U. S., 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
50 Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine, 339 U. S. 827 (1950).
51 U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
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desired copyrighted music. This system was approved, as long as
the right to a license for individual selections was available on a
reasonable basis.52
Proprietary Data (Know-How)
Rights to proprietary data-know-how or trade secrets-can
impinge on anti-trust restrictions when conveyed from one com-
pany to another. When such a conveyance is ancillary to a pat-
ent license, the same problems arise as with licenses generally,except that more care is required because proprietary data do not
have the status of justification by statute that can be asserted
for patents.
Conveyance of proprietary data to competitors, in this coun-
try, occurs to some extent, but there is a greater incentive to make
agreements for conveyance of proprietary data to manufacturers
in other countries, and some of them have been the subjects of
anti-trust litigation.
In the famous case of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States,53 the American manufacturer owned less than half of the
stock of a British manufacturer. The American and British con-
cerns each owned half the stock of a French manufacturer. The
foreign companies were supplied with manufacturing data of the
American company, and they agreed not to sell any products
except under the American company's brand, and to sell at pre-
scribed prices except within their allotted territories. Dominance
of the tapered bearing field was clearly shown, even though
patent control had expired, and although some competition exist-
ed with other types of bearings such as ball bearings. The agree-
ments were held to be prohibited restraints of foreign trade
(that is, trade between the United States and foreign countries)
because of the price fixing and allocation of markets.
The opinions in the Timken case, both for the majority and
minority in the Supreme Court, used language not entirely ap-
propriate to the facts. The majority indicated that the fixing of
prices and allocation of sales territories could not be justified by
the fact that the foreign concerns were subsidiaries of or con-
trolled by the American manufacturer. The minority believed
that control of activities of subsidiaries should be permitted. The
fact was that the British and French concerns were not subsidi-
aries because the American company did not own a controlling
quantity of stock.54
It is beyond question that a manufacturer may establish
branch factories and sales branches and may instruct them on
what to make, what prices to charge, what territories to serve,
and the like, without fear of violating the anti-trust laws. One
52 Alden Rochelle v. A. S. C. A. P., 80 F. Supp. 888 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
53 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U. S., 341 U. S. 593 (1951).
54 See District Court's decision, U. S. v. Timken, 83 F. Supp. 284, 311 (N. D.
Ohio 1949).
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cannot conspire with oneself. The fact that some of the branch
operations, either in this country or in a foreign country, may
take the form of wholly-owned subsidiaries should make no dif-
ference, as it is the fact of ownership and control that is im-
portant rather than the form of organization. Consequently,
there should be no hesitancy about making suitable arrangements
for allocating business among completely-owned branch or sub-
sidiary operations.
Different considerations apply when there is significant mi-
nority ownership, as it is possible for agreements with partly-
owned subsidiaries, if of a kind which might restrain trade, to be
regarded as made for the benefit of the minority owners, and to
be prohibited.
If there is no subsidiary relation, because of absence of stock
control, as in the Timken case, agreements should be governed
by the same rules as those made with complete strangers.
In agreements for conveyance of proprietary data to a com-
petitor in this country it is preferable for the agreement not to be
exclusive. But in agreements with foreign concerns it is common
to stipulate that the same data will not be supplied to others in
the same country, since such a stipulation can hardly be re-
garded as a restraint of trade of the United States. It is also
proper to require the recipient to keep the data confidential and
not to use the data except in his own country. Care must be
taken, though, in not placing undue restrictions on sales of prod-
ucts, as it is just such restrictions that were condemned in the
Timken case.
An exchange of proprietary data is more likely to be trouble-
some than a one-way conveyance, as is demonstrated by United
States v. Imperial Chem. Ind.55 There, the two principals, in the
United States and Great Britian, agreed to exchange patent li-
censes and data for future inventions, and also jointly owned
manufacturing concerns in certain other countries. The under-
taking to exchange rights and the joint ownership of operating
companies were both held to be illegal.
Trademarks
Until recently, trademarks were regarded as inseparable
from the goodwill of the user, and therefore as not capable of
being licensed, except in the situations involving certification of
quality or origin, or membership in an organization. It is generally
recognized now that legitimate business purposes are served by
licensing use of trademarks, as long as there is no deception of
purchasers and proper control is maintained by the trademark
owner. In fact, licensing is provided for in the federal trademark
statute.
56
55 U. S. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y.
1952).
56 15 U. S. C. §§ 1055, 1127.
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Certification marks are those which certify the maintenance
of a prescribed standard, such as the famous "Sanforized" mark
on cotton garments. A curious limitation of the trademark stat-
ute is that registrations of certification marks may be cancelled
if the owner of the registration deals in the goods bearing the
certification mark, or if the owner refuses to certify the goods
of anyone who maintains the prescribed standards. 57 No sound
basis for these restrictions is apparant, and their result is simply
that those who wish to do business in one of these ways do so
without benefit of a United States trademark registration, rely-
ing on common law rights for their protection.
The trademark statute expressly provides that a trademark
registration, which can become conclusive evidence of the own-
er's exclusive right to use the trademark, will not have that
effect if "the mark has been or is being used to violate the anti-
trust laws of the United States." 58 This has been stated to
amount to a possible defense in an infringement suit, but it clearly
does not go that far. It is merely a rule of evidence.
In general, trademark licenses are no different from other
agreements in their relation to anti-trust laws. Thus an agree-
ment requiring use of a trademark and at the same time prohibit-
ing use of the trademark in certain territories was held to be a
prohibited division of markets.59
A special situation concerning imported goods has been men-
tioned as a possible limitation of the anti-trust laws.0" The stat-
utes prohibit importation of goods bearing a copy of a trade-
mark, especially when the trademark is registered and the regis-
tration certificate is filed with the customs authorities. These stat-
utes have been interpreted as permitting exclusion of genuine
foreign merchandise imported by anyone other than the concern
owning the trademark rights in the United States."' Recently,
attempts have been made to restrict or terminate this provision,
either by judicial interpretation or legislation. In particular, an
administration-sponsored bi102 is so extreme as practically to end
all trademark protection if the same trademark is ever used by
legally distinct concerns in different countries. Those engaged
in importation or in manufacture in more than one country
should keep informed as to the progress of such legislative pro-
posals.
Another area in which legislative changes may occur is that
of "fair trade" price fixing.6 3 The laws permitting a supplier of
57 Id. §'1064.
58 Id. § 1115b.
59 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U. S., 341 U. S. 593 (1951). See also note
52 supra.
60 See note 9 supra.
61 Bourjois v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 689 (1923).
62 H. R. 7234 (86th Congress).
63 See note 8 supra.
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branded merchandise to stipulate a minimum resale price have
been held to be invalid in many states. There are consequently
active attempts to formulate more effective laws, both in Con-
gress and in state legislatures, to permit price fixing. The de-
sirability and probable enforceability of such legislation are both
quite controversial.
Summary
The subject of this paper is vast and complex, and this dis-
cussion is no more than an introductory outline. No attempt has
been made here to distinguish actions which have been held to
be violations per se from those which are violations only when
a monopoly results, yet this is a very important distinction.
Those confronted with specific questions should make a de-
tailed investigation of the law. A good preliminary guide, repre-
senting the best thinking of many experts in the Department of
Justice and in private practice, is contained in the 1955 "Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws," which is still reasonably up-to-date and can be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington
25, D. C. for $1.25.
In particular, it must be remembered that actions which are
innocuous when they occur alone may represent a prohibited
restraint of trade when combined.64
In spite of the complexity of the subject there are some
rather simple rules which will avoid most of the pitfalls described
in the numerous cases in this field.
1. Don't make licenses unavailable
There must always be some one person or concern who has
the unrestricted right to grant licenses, even though he may
choose not to exercise that right.
2. Don't give up control to licensees
The owner of a patent or other intellectual property right
(this includes an exclusive licensee since he is effectively the
owner) must make his own decisions as to who is to be licensed,
as to terms of licenses, etc. No restrictions should be placed on
the freedom of the owner to make these decisions.
3. Don't attempt to protect a licensee's business
Price fixing of patented products and certain other restric-
tions in licenses have been approved as protection for the busi-
ness of the patent owner. These restrictions should not be used
to protect a licensee's business, especially not when the patent
owner has no business of his own to protect.
64 U. S. v. General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N. J. 1949).
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4. Don't combine a license and a negative covenant
A license, although basically a waiver of a legal right to
exclude, may be considered as a positive grant of rights. The
grant may be as broad or narrow as the owner chooses to make
it. But once the scope of the grant has been defined, it is hazard-
ous to place in a license document any separate covenant restrict-
ing operations of the licensee.
5. Don't exchange future rights
When existing rights are licensed, it is proper to provide for
an ancillary exchange of similar rights for improvements for a
limited future time. An agreement which is primarily an ex-
change of future rights is hazardous.
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